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Abstract  
 
This paper estimates the impact of a Chilean cash for grades programme, the Bono por Logro 
Escolar (BLE) in 2013, on future educational outcomes. The cash transfer was targeted using two 
scores from 2012, an income index and academic performance. I implement a sharp regression 
discontinuity design along these two running variables. I show that students marginally at each side 
of the two thresholds used only differed in receiving the BLE in 2013. The main causal estimates for 
the outcomes are not statistically significantly different from zero. Additionally, the main causal 
estimates are centred around zero and their standard errors are small. If a local average effect of 
the BLE in 2013 exists this is at best modest in magnitude. Any potential impact of the BLE in 2013 
would have been at least smaller than those found in developing countries, where effects of at least 
0.17 of a standard deviation on test scores have been observed. 
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Introduction  
 
Should we pay children to learn? Few people are indifferent in regard to this controversial question. 
Finding a response to this question is particularly relevant for the United States where, by 2008, at 
least twelve states had adopted schemes where primary and secondary school students were 
rewarded with money for obtaining good grades or test scores or passing exams (Toppo, 2008). 
 
Over the last eleven years, the public debate around this issue has been noticeable. Several articles 
have been published in the United States’ mainstream newspapers (Calefati, 2008; Guttenplan, 
2011; Higgins, 2015; Roberts, Becker, & Ibanga, 2008). The discussion seemed to reach its peak in 
2010. During that spring the question: should schools bribe kids? and the corresponding reply “it 
can work, if it is done right” made it to the cover of Time Magazine (Ripley, 2010), while in the 
autumn of the same year, the Annual Poll of the Public’s Attitudes Toward the Public Schools 
revealed that 76% of United States’ adults opposed the idea of school districts paying small 
amounts of money to students to read books or get good grades (Bushaw & Lopez, 2010).1 
 
How cash for grades programmes work is also a matter of active deliberation. Kremer, Miguel, and 
Thornton (2009), Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011) and Fryer (2011) offer syntheses about how 
these policies operate. On the one hand, incentives provide a price effect that makes specific 
behaviours more attractive. These economic effects are expected to increase individuals’ effort 
and performance. On the other hand, a psychological effect potentially exists. This could 
undermine intrinsic motivation, negatively affecting the desired behaviours, especially after the 
reward is removed.2  
 
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of cash for grades schemes is mixed. In Ohio, an effect of 
0.15𝜎 is estimated for maths but no impact is observed in three other subjects (Bettinger, 2012). In 
Kenya, an effect of 0.19𝜎 in test scores and other positive externalities have been found (Kremer et 
al., 2009). In Israel, the results are positive and statistically significant only for girls (Angrist & Lavy, 
2009). In New York, mostly no effects have been observed (Fryer, 2011; Riccio et al., 2013). In 
Mexico, effects from 0.17𝜎 to 0.30𝜎 in maths test scores have been estimated but these are partly 
explained by students’ cheating (Behrman, Parker, Todd, & Wolpin, 2015). In lab experiments, 
characterised by immediate but lower rewards, some positive effects have been found in Chicago 
(Levitt, List, Neckermann, & Sadoff, 2012) and India (Hirshleifer, 2017).3  
 
                                                     
1 Educational philosophers have not been able to agree on this topic either. To illustrate, Sidorkin (2007, 2009) argues that 
moral reasons exist for paying students. He suggests that, at least for low-income students, most of the economic value 
of their education is received by the society, not themselves. Accordingly, for these students, schooling does not represent 
a consumer good but a form of labour that deserves fair compensation. Conversely, Warnick (2017) questions cash for 
grades programmes on ethical grounds. His main argument is that cash incentives are uniquely corruptive of key 
educational aims and values. Specifically, he claims that these schemes hinder the development of students’ self-control, 
promote advancing private versus public ends and additionally reinforce a perception of students as market actors. 
2 This last argument is quite contested in psychology. After conducting a meta-analysis, a group of authors conclude that, 
generally, extrinsic rewards are not harmful to motivation (Cameron, 2001; Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001; Cameron & 
Pierce, 1994). However, Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999; 2001) and Kohn (1999) have claimed for substantial weakening 
effects after reassessing evidence on this topic. 
3 I provide more information about the design and results of all these interventions in Appendix A. All these evaluations are 
randomised control trials. In all cases, randomisation did not occur at the individual level. 
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My paper adds to this body of knowledge. Specifically, I assess the effect of a cash for grades 
intervention in Chile on subsequent educational outcomes. The Bono por Logro Escolar consists of a 
one-off cash transfer of up to $50,000 CLP ($100 USD approximately) given to high achieving 
students from fifth to twelfth grade. The programme intends to provide an incentive or reward for 
students’ effort and overall academic achievement. My assessment is mostly done for the first 
version of the BLE, which was implemented in the middle of the 2013 academic year (and used 
information from 2012 to determine eligibility). Using large and rich administrative datasets, the 
outcomes I analyse are attendance and average grade for the academic years 2013 and 2014.  
 
I use a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design to recover the causal estimates. To be eligible for 
the BLE, students needed to belong to the poorest 30% of the population and be in the top 30% in 
terms of performance within their cohort. I compare students just below and above each of these 
two thresholds. Students at one side or the other of each threshold only differ in whether they receive 
the BLE. Thus, any differences in outcomes can be attributed to the programme. This empirical 
strategy is suitable as the BLE was implemented retrospectively. Students did not know that 
information from 2012 would determine whether they would be a recipient in 2013.   
 
Each main causal estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero for both types of 
outcomes. Additionally, the main causal estimates are centred around zero and their standard 
errors are small. As a result, each 95% confidence interval contains values of a small magnitude 
exclusively. To illustrate, the highest upper bound I find for any 95% confidence interval is 0.035 
(0.056𝜎) for average grade and 0.49% (0.052𝜎) for attendance. In practical terms, these estimates 
are near a third of the minimum distance between reported grades in the country’s educational 
system and are equivalent to a day of school attendance within an academic year.  
 
If a local average effect of the BLE in 2013 exists this is at best modest in magnitude. Therefore, I am 
unable to detect it with statistical certainty. Additionally, the analysis by subgroups does not 
consistently show estimates that are statistically significantly different from zero. These results 
cannot be generalised for the entire population who received the BLE in 2013 given that the RD 
estimates are only valid for students near the two thresholds used to target the BLE. Among these 
students, any potential impact of the BLE in 2013 would have been at least smaller than those found 
in developing countries, where effects of at least 0.17𝜎 on test scores have been observed. 
 
A possible reason for these results is that the programme was not very salient for the population. If 
children and adolescents were unaware of the implementation of the BLE then it would not be 
expected to observe changes in their behaviour. An alternative explanation is that students and their 
families were aware of the cash transfer but unresponsive to its size. Another potential cause of 
these results is that the BLE provided two types of effects that cancelled each other out overall.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section briefly describes the design and 
implementation of the Bono por Logro Escolar. The third section introduces the data sources, 
provides summary statistics and explains the empirical strategy. The fourth section presents the 
results of the impact assessment. The last section discusses the results and main implications. 
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Programme Description   
 
The design of the Bono por Logro Escolar attempted to provide a cash transfer for high achieving 
students in primary and secondary schools belonging to the poorest segments of the population. 
Only students enrolled between the fifth and twelfth grades and not older than 24 years old in year 
t–1 were eligible to receive the cash transfer in year t. According to the Chilean educational system 
this meant that, conditional on age, only students in the last four years of primary school (fifth 
through eighth grade) and all students in secondary education were eligible in principle.4 
 
In addition, to be eligible for the programme in year t students needed to belong to the poorest 30% 
of the population. The PFSE index measured this in year t–1.5 In practice, the threshold used in this 
relative income index was 98 points. Accordingly, to be eligible for the BLE in 2013, students 
needed to have a PFSE score in the year 2012 equal to or lower than 98 points.  
 
The academic performance requisite needed to receive the BLE in year t depended on students’ 
average grade in year t–1. Students needed to be in the top 30% of their cohort to be eligible for the 
BLE.6 Within each cohort the students were ranked. The number one was assigned to the student 
with the highest average grade. The average grade in Chile ranges from a minimum of one to a 
maximum of seven, is generated within each school, and is reported to the central level using only 
one decimal place. Ties were allowed in the ranking. For example, if two students had the same 
average grade and this grade was the highest in their cohort both received a value of one in the 
rankings. Also, in this scenario, the student or students with the second highest average grade 
received the third position. To be eligible for the BLE in year t the proportion between the student 
ranking and his or her cohort size in year t–1, the relative ranking, had to be no higher than 0.3. 
 
In 2013, the BLE provided a lump sum of $50,000 CLP ($100 USD approximately) for students in 
the top 15% of highest performance and $30,000 CLP for students within the 15% and 30% range. 
The size of the cohort needed to be at least seven students for this last rule to hold. If the cohort 
size was between two and six, only the first-ranked student in the cohort was eligible. 
 
The Ministry of Social Development first delivered the cash transfer in July 2013. Given that the 
Chilean academic year starts in March and ends in December, the BLE in 2013 was implemented in 
the middle of the academic year. Thereafter, the BLE has been given once per year with payments 
occurring between September and November. When it first started in 2013, the programme was 
implemented retrospectively. The rules regarding eligibility were established after December 2012, 
which marked the conclusion of the 2012 academic year.  
                                                     
4 The Decree number 24 of the Chilean Ministry of Social Development, published in June 2013, regulates general aspects 
of the cash transfer (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013).  
5 The PFSE index score was the result of the combination of a proxy means test and a means test. The former variable 
was the Social Protection File score. This proxy means test score provided the relative position of Chilean households 
regarding income by needs. Not having a Social Protection File score translated automatically in not being eligible for the 
BLE. The other variable in the PFSE formula was income per capita. The Ministry of Social Development built this variable 
from multiple administrative datasets.   
6 Three variables define an academic cohort: i) the school, ii) the type of education provided by that school (for example 
traditional or adult education, scientific-humanistic or technical-professional), and iii) the grade in which the students were 
enrolled. Students belonging to the same cohort have these three characteristics in common.  
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Until 2014, the BLE was paid in cash. Beneficiaries needed to collect their payments in person from 
local government agencies. From 2015, the BLE progressively adopted bank transfers. The BLE is 
paid to the student if they are at least 18 years old. Otherwise, a member of the student’s 
household, most likely the mother, receives the payment. In the Chilean educational system, 
students are, in theory, expected to graduate from their secondary studies at the age of 18. Hence, 
the majority of BLE payments are not received by the students but by another household member. 
 
The conception of the BLE is related to the Seguridades y Oportunidades law approved in May 
2012. Within this large piece of legislation, the Bono por Esfuerzo (Cash Payment for Effort) was 
created. This law establishes that the State can provide conditional cash transfers in diverse areas 
of social policies to foster social achievements. The Bono por Logro Escolar (Cash Payment for 
Student Achievement) was created in 2013 following this logic. Consequently, the public discourse 
from politicians and public managers about the goals of the BLE has been that the programme is a 
tool to appreciate, incentivise or reward students' achievement and effort. This logic has been 
unaltered despite successive changes of coalitions in government.  
  
I assess whether receiving the BLE in 2013 impacted attendance and academic performance in 
2013 and 2014. I analyse the programme in 2013 because I can guarantee that students were not 
aware that their academic performance in 2012 would have an impact on whether they received 
the BLE in 2013. This is not necessarily true for the programme in 2014 (which was implemented 
using information from the academic year 2013) and for its later versions.  
 
The research questions respond to the design, implementation and goals of the BLE but also the 
literature on cash for grades. Students who received the BLE in 2013 were expected to increase 
their effort (which, in this paper, is measured through attendance) and future academic 
performance to receive it again in the future. Additionally, the cash transfers could have had an 
effect through investments leading to better educational outcomes. From the psychological 
standpoint, a common concern related to these types of programmes is that they could have an 
adverse effect through decreased motivation after the incentive is withdrawn. Given that the BLE 
has remained through the years there is less support for an argument of this kind. 
 
Data and Methods    
 
This section describes the data and methods. The first subsection introduces the data. The second 
part of the section explains how I structure the dataset for the analysis. The third subsection 
provides descriptive statistics. Finally, the fourth part discusses the methodological approach I use 
to recover the causal estimates of the BLE, the regression discontinuity design. 
 
Data  
 
The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) provided most of the datasets I use in this paper. I 
combine the datasets using the individual ID number provided by the Chilean State. For privacy 
purposes the ID numbers were changed by the MSD using an algorithm that is unknown to me. The 
three primary sources of information for this research are as follows: 
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Bono por Logro Escolar Dataset 
 
Created since 2013 and replicated annually by the MSD, this dataset contains information for all 
students between the fifth and twelfth grades in year t–1. The dataset excludes students in flexible 
adult and differential education. Each dataset has approximately 1,900,000 students. I requested 
two versions of this dataset (the years 2013 and 2014) for this paper. Some variables available in 
this dataset are: i) school ID, ii) type of school (with categories such as traditional primary 
education, scientific-humanistic or technical-professional secondary education), iii) grade, iv) 
average grade, v) attendance, vi) student ID, vii) age, viii) student ranking in the cohort, ix) cohort 
size, and x) PFSE score. All these variables refer to year t–1. Another key variable in this dataset 
denotes whether the student was a recipient of the BLE in year t.   
 
Ministry of Education (ME) Performance Dataset 
 
This dataset is created each year by the Ministry of Education, which later shares it with the MSD. 
The dataset contains information for all students who finish the academic year from the first 
through to the twelfth grade (except for flexible adult and differential education). Each version of 
this dataset has approximately 2,950,000 students. I have at my disposal eight datasets (from 
2009 until 2016). The variables available in this dataset are the same as in points i) to vi) of the 
BLE Dataset.7 More educational information at the school level is available from public sources. 
Using the variable school ID, as a key to merge, I obtain the schools’: i) administrative dependency 
(such as public or private subsidised), ii) geographic location, and iii) urban or rural status.  
 
Social Protection File (SPF) Dataset 
 
This dataset contains information for Chilean households and all their members. Each observation 
represents an individual (adult or child) who lives in a household. Each household has a unique ID 
number that allows for the identification of all the individuals who belong to it. Households 
voluntarily requested the SPF at the local government level. The SPF information was essential to 
be eligible for multiple social policies. From January 2010, the dataset had 10,782,270 individuals 
(Comité de Expertos Ficha de Protección Social, 2010), approximately 63.5% of Chile’s population. 
I use two versions of this dataset (years 2012 and 2013) in this research. The MSD administers the 
dataset. Some of its variables are household structure, gender and schooling. With this information 
I can generate additional variables such as household size, female head of household and years of 
schooling of the head of the household 
 
Dataset Structure and Sample  
 
To carry out the impact assessment, I structure the dataset by cohorts (years t: 2013 and 2014). 
Each year-cohort uses information from years t–1, t and t+1. The BLE Dataset of year t provides 
the programme recipients in year t and, among other variables, the academic performance and 
                                                     
7 All these variables are from year t. For example, the 2013 ME Performance Dataset provides the average grade for the 
academic year 2013. The 2013 BLE Dataset provides the average grade for the academic year 2012. 
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PFSE scores from year t–1. These last two variables are useful to assess eligibility for the cash 
transfer. I use the information from the SPF of year t–1, the same year as the PFSE score, for 
characterisation. Finally, future average grade and attendance come from the ME Performance 
Datasets of years t and/or t+1. This organisation is presented in detail in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Dataset Structure by BLE Year-Cohorts 
 
BLE 
Cohorts 
Previous Academic 
Performance and  
PFSE Score 
SPF 
Information 
BLE 
Recipient 
Future Average Grade 
and Attendance 
Year 2013 2012  2012  2013  2013 & 2014  
Year 2014  2013  2013  2014  2015  
 
The body of the paper presents the results for the 2013 cohort. This cohort is more likely to provide 
valid causal estimates as students were not aware that their academic performance in 2012 would 
affect whether they received the BLE in 2013. I show the results for the 2014 cohort in an appendix.   
 
The sample excludes students in the eleventh and twelfth grades in year t–1. This restriction limits 
the sample to students that would not (or were unlikely to) graduate from secondary education in 
years t–1 or t. Therefore, these students were more likely to have been enrolled in primary or 
secondary education in years t and t+1, which reduces sample attrition. Additionally, I exclude from 
the analysis those students whose cohort size in year t–1 was lower than seven. 
 
I also exclude students who were at least 18 years old in the month of year t in which the BLE was 
paid. This action intends to restrict the sample to students that were unable to collect their 
payments personally. Hence, the impact estimates are only valid for those students whose cash 
transfer was collected by a household member. The effect for students aged 18 years or older, 
who could collect their payments on their own, could not be estimated due to low statistical power.  
 
Another essential characteristic of the sample is that it is comprised exclusively of students that 
had a PFSE score, and accordingly a valid SPF score. 76.9% of the students in the BLE 2013 
Dataset had a valid PFSE score. This is not a representative sample of the population of Chilean 
students, as households with higher earnings were less likely to request a Social Protection File. 
 
These characteristics of the sample do not favour making inferences about the whole student 
body. However, this is not problematic if the main findings of this study are linked only to students 
from the fifth to the tenth grades with a Social Protection File in 2012 who were younger than 18 
years old in 2013. Given that this subset of students is more likely to be recipients of cash for 
grades programmes, the relevance of the findings of this study holds. 
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Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the BLE in 2013. The first four columns of the table 
display the mean values for four subsets of students. I obtain these subsets after splitting the 
sample by PFSE score (below or equal to 98 points and above this threshold) and by relative 
ranking (equal to or lower than 0.3 and values higher than this threshold). Thus, the first column 
only contains students who were eligible for the BLE in 2013. The last four columns of the table 
give the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the entire sample.  
 
Panel A shows the mean for the variable BLE recipient in 2013. The mean is one in the first column 
and zero in the second, third and fourth columns. These results show full compliance for the BLE in 
2013. Every student in the sample who was eligible for the cash transfer was provided with it (if the 
cash transfer was collected by an adult member of his or her household). Conversely, students 
who were ineligible for the BLE in 2013 did not have any access to the cash transfer that year. The 
fifth column of the table shows that approximately 14% of the students in the sample were 
provided with the BLE in 2013. 
 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the variables influencing eligibility for the BLE in 2013. 
The mean PFSE score in the sample is 113 points with a minimum of 24 and a maximum of 769. 
Among the BLE recipients, the mean PFSE score is 58.6 points. The mean value for average grade 
in 2012 is 5.48. For students in the highest 30% of academic performance the mean is higher than 
6.00, while for students who are not in this group the mean is around 5.20. The average cohort size 
is 86.2 students while the average student ranking is 41.1. 
 
Panel C shows that students in the highest 30% in terms of academic performance had a higher 
percentage of attendance relative to students outside of this group. Regarding the type of school 
attended, the poorest 30% were more likely to attend public schools and approximately seven out 
of ten students were enrolled in a traditional primary school. Three out of ten students attended 
traditional secondary schools. Among this group of students, enrolment in scientific-humanistic 
(SH) schools was nearly twice that in technical-professional (TP) schools. Students with a PFSE 
score higher than 98 points were slightly more likely to be enrolled in a secondary SH school 
relative to their peers with a PFSE score lower than or equal to 98 points. 
 
From Panel D, we see that the sample mean age in 2012 is 12.53 years and that boys were less 
likely to be part of the highest academically achieving group than girls. Additionally, students in the 
poorest 30% of the population had a head of household with fewer years of schooling, who was 
more likely to be female and less likely to be employed compared to students who were not among 
the poorest 30%. In relative terms, students with a PFSE score no higher than 98 were also more 
likely to attend a rural school and to live outside the metropolitan (or capital) region. 
Cristian Crespo          8  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the BLE in 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
Variables 
Relative Ranking ≤ 0.3 Relative Ranking > 0.3 
Total 
PFSE ≤ 98 PFSE > 98 PFSE ≤ 98 PFSE > 98 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: BLE Recipient in 2013 
BLE Recipient in 2013 1 0 0 0 0.141 0.348 0 1 
Panel B: BLE Eligibility Variables in 2012 
PFSE Score 58.6 165.4 57.9 161.9 113.0 67.3 24 769 
Average Grade 6.04 6.09 5.18 5.23 5.48 0.55 4.0 7.0 
SR: Student Ranking 12.6 13.5 51.0 57.4 41.1 50.1 1 786 
CS: Cohort Size 82.9 91.6 79.5 91.2 86.2 79.3 7 786 
SR/CS: Relative Ranking 0.156 0.149 0.646 0.630 0.483 0.284 0.001 1 
Panel C: Attendance and School Information in 2012 
Attendance (%) 93.9 94.4 91.3 92.2 92.5 7.0 1 100 
Public School 0.521 0.425 0.520 0.409 0.465 0.499 0 1 
Primary Traditional Education 0.685 0.682 0.717 0.678 0.693 0.461 0 1 
Secondary SH Traditional Education 0.197 0.223 0.177 0.227 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Secondary TP Traditional Education 0.112 0.091 0.096 0.088 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Panel D: Demographic Information 
Age in 2012 (Years) 12.44 12.39 12.58 12.60 12.53 1.82 8 16 
Male 0.418 0.438 0.525 0.538 0.499 0.500 0 1 
Head of Household Schooling (Years) 9.23 10.77 8.78 10.34 9.74 3.37 0 24 
Household Monthly Income ($CLP) 112,418.9 272,970.4 108,020.8 256,265.9 189,150.7 194,888.1 0 15,276,972 
Metropolitan Region 0.329 0.365 0.324 0.374 0.349 0.477 0 1 
Rural School 0.116 0.070 0.121 0.067 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Head of Household is Female 0.582 0.294 0.601 0.331 0.450 0.498 0 1 
Head of Household is Employed 0.710 0.818 0.704 0.804 0.760 0.427 0 1 
Household Size 4.18 4.19 4.28 4.24 4.24 1.45 1 33 
Household Number of Rooms 1.95 2.23 1.93 2.20 2.08 0.93 0 63 
Number of Observations 149,834 188,959 357,416 368,451 1,064,660  
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Methodological Approach 
 
Regression Discontinuity Designs: Sharp vs Fuzzy, One vs Multiple Running Variables 
 
A researcher interested in identifying the causal relationship between receiving the BLE and future 
attendance or academic performance needs a suitable strategy for doing so. For example, a 
simple comparison of outcomes among those who receive the cash transfer and those who do not 
is likely to provide biased estimates. Restricting the comparisons to subsets of the population is 
not likely to work either. Within students in the highest 30% of student achievement, BLE recipients 
differ relative to non-recipients regarding key observable characteristics such as the type of school 
they attend or the schooling of their household’s heads. An analogous situation happens within the 
poorest 30%. In this case, BLE recipients and non-recipients are not comparable regarding their 
previous attendance and gender, among other variables. 
 
An alternative approach is a regression discontinuity design. In all RD designs some exogenous 
variation in treatment occurs around a threshold of a running variable or rating score. Two types of 
RD designs exist: sharp and fuzzy. In fuzzy RD designs the running variable is a relevant factor, but 
not the only one, in explaining treatment status. In sharp RD designs treatment is fully explained by 
the running variable. In the context of RD designs to evaluate the impact of cash transfers, a sharp 
RD design is suitable for causal inference only if all units that meet the eligibility criteria (generally 
those having a score below a threshold) receive the cash transfer and if all units that do not meet 
the criteria never receive the cash transfer. 
 
A sharp RD design is a suitable approach in this paper. In the simplest sharp RD design only one 
running variable and threshold exists. Here there are two running variables. Regardless, I can use 
two different sharp RD designs depending on how I restrict the sample. For example, if I utilise the 
subset of students in the highest 30% of academic performance, I can implement a sharp RD 
design using the PFSE scores as a running variable as the treatment changes from zero to one at 
the 98-point threshold (as shown in the first two columns of Panel A in Table 2). Similarly, I can 
execute another sharp RD design if I restrict the sample to the poorest 30%. 
 
I employ these two alternatives in the paper. Their details are explained later in this subsection. 
This type of approach, with more than one running variable and where a restricted sample is used 
to implement an RD design, has been labelled a frontier RD estimation (Reardon & Robinson, 2012) 
and provides frontier-specific estimates (Wong, Steiner, & Cook, 2013). Consequently, I report two 
frontier-specific estimates in this paper. The first type of estimate informs us about the effect of 
the BLE in 2013 solely for students around the 30% of lowest income. The second type of estimate 
does so only for students near the 30% of highest achievement. 
 
To obtain causal estimates, RD designs compare outcomes for units just above and below a 
threshold in a running variable. In a context of two running variables, the alternative to estimating 
two frontier-specific effects is to estimate a unique frontier-average treatment effect directly. This 
can be done either by estimating the discontinuity in the outcome along both thresholds 
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simultaneously using bivariate regressions or by collapsing the two running variables into a single 
one (Wong et al., 2013). Either of these two approaches will imply using more complex methods 
and assumptions. Given that the frontier-average treatment estimate is the result of a weighted 
average of frontier-specific estimates (Wong et al., 2013) I opt to provide only the latter type of 
estimate and use standard (univariate) RD estimation strategies and assumptions. 
 
Local Randomisation vs Continuity-Based Framework in RD Designs 
 
In RD designs, causal inference relies on the assumption that the average outcome for units 
marginally at one side of the threshold must represent a valid counterfactual for the group just at 
the other side of the threshold (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001; Lee, 2008). Despite this 
common theoretical understanding, there are disparities in, and a lack of consensus about how RD 
designs are interpreted and implemented in practice (Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 2018a). Two 
frameworks exist for RD analysis: local randomisation and continuity-based. These two 
frameworks rely on different identification assumptions and, consequently, differ in their strategies 
for estimation and the tests they use to assess the internal validity of their estimates (Cattaneo, 
Titiunik, & Vazquez-Bare, 2017b; Sekhon & Titiunik, 2017). In practice, the continuity-based 
framework is most commonly employed (Cattaneo et al., 2018a). 
 
Researchers who adopt the local randomisation framework use the logic of experimental designs 
to recover causal estimates. They take the simple average of the outcome in a small window on 
either side of the index’ threshold. Hence, the impact estimate is equivalent to the difference in 
means across the cutoff point. The same approach is used to assess the quality of the 
randomisation. The underlying assumption of this framework is that the average potential 
outcomes are uncorrelated with the running variable within a small neighbourhood close to the 
threshold (Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 2018b).8 For this assumption to hold, the treatment needs 
to be at least as good as randomly assigned for units within a distance w from the cutoff C. 
 
Researchers relying on the continuity-based framework use regression at each side of the 
threshold to predict the limiting value of the outcome precisely at the threshold. In this framework 
the running variable can be associated with average potential outcomes, but this association is 
assumed to be smooth at the threshold. Therefore, this continuity assumption allows us to 
interpret any discontinuity in the conditional expectation of the outcome (as a function of the 
running variable) at the threshold as causal evidence of the treatment (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). 
To assess the internal validity of the causal estimates, it is necessary to check whether the 
distributions of the pre-treatment variables show discontinuities. Repeated discontinuities in these 
distributions at the threshold cast doubt on the plausibility of the continuity assumption. 
 
Within the continuity-based framework, when the estimation uses only observations near the 
threshold the approach is known as local polynomial or non-parametric (or a combination of these 
                                                     
8 Each observation i has two potential outcomes. 𝑌𝑖(1) is the hypothetical outcome that would be observed if assigned to 
treatment while 𝑌𝑖(0) would be observed in case of being assigned to the control group. In a sharp RD context, we can only 
observe 𝑌𝑖(1) for units at one side of the threshold (while 𝑌𝑖(0) remains unobserved for this group) and 𝑌𝑖(0) for units at the 
other side of the threshold (with 𝑌𝑖(1) being unobserved for this group). 
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two terms). Conversely, a global or flexible parametric model uses all or most of the running 
variable's support. The former approach has been recommended over the latter in the recent 
literature (Cattaneo et al., 2018a; Cattaneo et al., 2017b) due to its increased capacity to predict 
boundary points, the estimate of interest in the continuity-based RD framework. 
 
The local randomisation framework requires a stronger assumption relative to the continuity-based 
framework (Cattaneo et al., 2018b). For the causal estimates to be unbiased in the local 
randomisation framework, the average potential outcomes need to be uncorrelated with the 
running variable along the whole interval [C–w, C+w]. If this assumption holds, then the continuity 
assumption on which the other RD framework relies holds. However, continuity does not assure 
local independence between the average potential outcomes and the running variable. 
 
A priori, I am not able to guarantee that the local randomization RD framework central assumption 
holds. For example, by design PFSE scores are highly correlated with income per capita, a variable 
that in turn may be correlated with future academic performance and attendance within the 
neighbourhood around the 98-point threshold. Similarly, previous academic performance is likely to 
be a strong predictor of future academic performance within the interval [C–w, C+w]. In any of 
these cases, RD estimates equivalent to differences in means will most likely be biased. 
 
In contrast, the continuity assumption holds more plausibly in the two sharp RD applications I 
propose. Accordingly, the body of the paper focuses on the continuity-based RD framework. 
Regardless, I discuss the local randomisation RD framework and its results in an appendix. 
 
RD Application #1: Sharp RD Design Using PFSE Score in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
In the first RD application, I use the PFSE score as a running variable. I implement a sharp RD 
design after restricting the sample to students in the highest 30% of academic performance. 
 
Because I use a continuity-based RD framework, first I need to choose the size h of the bandwidth. 
The size of the bandwidth determines which observations of the income index (around the 98-point 
PFSE threshold) are used in the local regression. Hence this design relies only upon units within 
the interval [98–h, 98+h]. I choose h in a data-driven way to avoid selecting it arbitrarily. More 
precisely, I choose the h that minimises the mean squared error of the local polynomial estimator. 
This is the most popular approach for bandwidth selection in RD designs (Cattaneo et al., 2018a). I 
obtain the causal estimates from the following regression: 
 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐼1𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑓(∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸𝑖) + 𝛾1𝑓(∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸𝑖)𝐼1𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖, 
 
where 𝑌𝑖  is average grade or attendance for student i in year t or t+1.  ∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸𝑖 is the 98–PFSE score 
in t–1 for student i (distance to the 98-point PFSE threshold). 𝐼1𝑖 is a binary variable that takes a 
value of zero if ∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸𝑖 is negative. Otherwise, 𝐼1𝑖 is one. 𝑓(𝑥) is a local polynomial of x of order p. 
𝜀1𝑖 is the error term, the difference between the observed and predicted values. 
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In this approach 𝛽1 corresponds to the causal effect. Cattaneo et al. (2018a) recommend using a 
triangular kernel in the regression. Additionally, they recommend that the order p of the local 
polynomial for use in the estimations should be one or two. For inference, I assume that the 
observations are clustered by schools. To assess the internal validity, I use the same local 
regression but I replace 𝑌𝑖 with each variable of 𝑋𝑖
′, a vector of pre-treatment variables. After 
running the regression for each pre-treatment variable, I perform a test of joint significance. If the 
hypothesis of no joint significance is rejected the continuity assumption is unlikely to hold. 
 
RD Application #2: Sharp RD Design Using Average Grade in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
A second candidate for running variable is the relative ranking in 2012. Although students did not 
know that their relative academic performance in 2012 was being used for the BLE assignment in 
2013, this is not a suitable running variable. The relative ranking is a result of a two-step 
administrative procedure that transforms the average grade of each student. The first step 
transforms the average grade into a ranking. The second step transforms the latter value into a 
relative ranking by dividing the student ranking by the number of students in the cohort. This two-
step procedure non-randomly affects the position of students near the 0.3 threshold and causes 
them not to be comparable around it. Accordingly, there is no valid counterfactual as potential 
outcomes are likely to differ for units across the 0.3 threshold in the relative ranking.9 
 
In my second RD application I use the average grade in 2012 as a running variable. I implement a 
sharp RD design after restricting the sample to the poorest 30% of the students. The average grade 
in 2012 is a suitable candidate for a running variable in a sharp RD design. This variable changed 
the eligibility for the BLE in 2013 deterministically. Among the 30% poorest students, those whose 
average grade in 2012 was equal to or higher than T received the BLE in 2013, while those whose 
average grade was lower than T did not receive it. T represents the average grade that determined 
which students were in the top 30% in terms of highest achievement in each academic cohort. 
Thus, various thresholds exist between cohorts. Unlike the relative ranking, the average grade is 
free from administrative sorting.10 Students that differ in their average grade by a tiny fraction are 
not expected to differ in terms of potential outcomes and pre-treatment variables. 
 
As there are different thresholds for multiple subgroups I implement a multi-cutoff RD design. 
The approach generally consists of normalising the running variable, for example assigning the 
value of zero to all units with a score of T, and then pooling all the observations (Cattaneo, Keele, 
Titiunik, & Vazquez-Bare, 2016a). This strategy has been used in multiple RD papers in topics such 
as education, poverty and health (Carneiro, Galasso, & Ginja, forthcoming; De la Mata, 2012; Lindo, 
Sanders, & Oreopoulos, 2010; Pop-Eleches & Urquiola, 2013). Accordingly, in my second RD 
                                                     
9 Appendix B provides empirical support for this argument. First, I present differences in means in a small window around 
the 0.3 threshold in the relative ranking for key pre-treatment variables. I find multiple, large and statistically significant 
differences. Then, I provide estimates for the continuity-based framework. I find comparable results relative to the local 
randomisation framework. Finally, the appendix explains how the procedure affects the position of different types of 
students near the 0.3 relative ranking threshold systematically.   
10 Administrative sorting relates to procedures, beyond the control and knowledge of individuals, that affect the position 
of these individuals non-randomly near the threshold. Administrative sorting threatens the continuity assumption on which 
RD designs rely. 
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application I fit the following local regression (where 𝛽2 is the causal estimate): 
 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼2  +  𝛽2 𝐼2𝑖 + 𝜃2𝑓(∆𝐴𝐺𝑖) + 𝛾2𝑓(∆𝐴𝐺𝑖)𝐼2𝑖 +𝜀2𝑖, 
 
where 𝑌𝑖  is the average grade or attendance for student i in year t or t+1. ∆𝐴𝐺𝑖 is the average grade 
of student i in t–1 minus T (distance of average grade to the threshold). 𝐼2𝑖 is a binary variable that 
takes a value of one if ∆𝐴𝐺𝑖 is non-negative. Otherwise, the variable takes a value of zero. 𝑓(𝑥) is a 
local polynomial of x of order p. Finally, 𝜀2𝑖 corresponds to the error term. 
 
I could not select the bandwidth h driven by the data on this occasion. There are not enough unique 
values in the running variable to implement the algorithm that estimates the optimal bandwidth. 
This is explained by the average grade in Chile being rounded and reported only with one decimal 
place (the average grade is the result of a simple average of multiple courses).11 Instead, I opt for 
two values of h (h=0.2 and h=0.3). Given the average grade scale, these are the minimum 
bandwidths from which I can fit a local regression of order p one and two, respectively. The other 
technical aspects of the estimation (such as the type of kernel, the internal validity tests and 
clusterisation) are the same as in my first RD application. 
 
RD Graphs and Running Variable Density Test 
 
A key component of RD papers are graphs. I provide multiple types of figures to help the reader to 
assess the robustness of the key assumption, continuity, on which these designs rely. 
 
The first type shows the relationship between the running variable and the outcomes. In this case a 
clear discontinuity at the threshold is suggestive of a treatment effect. The second type presents 
the relationship between the running variable and pre-treatment variables. Repeated discontinuities 
at the threshold cast doubt on the plausibility of the continuity assumption. 
 
I build these two types of RD graphs following Cattaneo et al. (2018a). The running variable is 
shown on the horizontal axis while the outcome or pre-treatment variable is represented by the 
vertical axis. I calculate the average value of the vertical axis variable for a limited number of non-
overlapping bins of the running variable. These values are shown by dots. I add a fourth-degree 
polynomial, fitted in the original data, at each side of the threshold. The polynomial represents the 
association between the variables in the horizontal and vertical axes. The dashed lines surrounding 
each polynomial represent the 95% confidence interval of the fitted function. 
 
The third type of RD figures I provide in the paper are histograms of the running variable. A 
discontinuous density around the threshold usually indicates manipulation or sorting, which makes 
the continuity assumption on which the RD design mostly relies less likely to hold. I provide these 
                                                     
11 Given that my second running variable is rounded, there is a potential risk of a rounding error in the RD estimations. One 
way to account for this is to follow Lee and Card (2008) and assume random deviations between the true regression 
function and the approximating function and estimate confidence intervals based on standard errors that are clustered by 
the running variable. However, Kolesár and Rothe (2018) recommend against this practice. Another approach is to follow 
Dong (2015), but this implies modelling the curvature of the outcomes by the running variable within the discrete values 
used, adding complex and untestable assumptions to the estimates.  
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graphs along with the results of a manipulation test for discrete running variables (Frandsen, 
2017). I use this method instead of the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) because the latter tool 
performs poorly when the running variable is not continuous (Frandsen, 2017). 
 
Frandsen’s test is based on smooth approximations of the running variable density close to the 
threshold of interest. Accordingly, the test detects deviations in the running variable density. 
Therefore, if the test is rejected this is interpreted as a sign of manipulation or sorting. In this 
sense this test is like McCrary’s but Frandsen’s test uses only points immediately adjacent to the 
threshold. If I assume that the density of the running variable is linear near the threshold (k=0) the 
test will detect small deviations from linearity at the threshold. This is the most rigorous criterion. 
If I allow any degree of curvature for the density of the running variable (k>0) the test is less likely 
to be rejected. I run the test using three values of k (k = 0, 0.1 and 0.2), which allows me to assess 
the sensitivity of the estimates to the curvature of the running variable. 
 
Results 
 
This section presents the results of the impact assessment. The first subsection focuses on the 
use of PFSE scores in 2012 as a running variable. The second part is centred around the use of 
average grade in 2012 as a running variable. Only continuity-based RD estimates are shown in 
these subsections. The third part incorporates the findings of the previous two subsections and 
synthesises the results of the local randomisation RD framework, the impact of the BLE in 2014 
and the BLE in 2013 on subgroups (available in Appendixes C, D, and E, respectively). 
 
PFSE Score in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
RD Estimates 
 
Table 3 presents the RD estimates (𝛽1) for each outcome. The first four columns show the results 
for average grade in 2013 and 2014 while the last four columns do so for attendance. For each 
outcome, I present two estimates. Within each outcome, the first estimate uses a local quadratic 
regression (p = 2) while the second estimate uses a local linear regression (p = 1). 
 
The estimates for future average grade are all close to zero and statistically insignificant. The 
estimates range from –0.010 to –0.003 points. Concerning the standard deviation of average 
grade, these local regression outputs range from –0.015 to –0.005. The estimates for attendance 
in 2013 and 2014 are also close to zero and not statistically significant at any level of confidence. 
The estimates are negative for 2013 and positive for 2014. Overall, the range goes from –0.098% 
to 0.108% where these results translate approximately into a fifth of a school day. On the scale of 
the standard deviation of attendance the estimates range from –0.011 to 0.012. Among the 
estimates, the lowest standard error is 0.013𝜎 while the highest is 0.021𝜎. Therefore, if any RD 
estimate would have had an absolute value higher than 0.042𝜎 this would have been statistically 
different from zero with a 95% level of confidence. Depending on the estimate I analyse, this could 
have been statistically significant with an absolute value as low as 0.026𝜎. 
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RD estimates are more sensitive to bandwidth selection than any other component (Cattaneo et al., 
2018a). For this reason, these estimates are expected to be robust to different bandwidth sizes. 
Table 4 and Table 5 present again the results of the continuity-based framework for future average 
grade and attendance. On this occasion, I test two alternative bandwidths for each specification 
(column) of Table 3. I change the size of bandwidth h by 1.5 times and by half. Modifying the size 
of the bandwidth reveals few changes relative to the estimates in Table 3. Table 4 shows that the 
estimates for average grade in 2013 and 2014 remain near zero, are all statistically insignificant 
and mostly negative. Table 5 focuses on attendance. The estimates are close to zero, negative in 
2013 and positive in 2014, and they all lack statistical significance. 
 
Table 6 presents RD estimates for ten pre-treatment variables. None of these variables could have 
been affected by the BLE in 2013. Consequently, this exercise helps to assess the plausibility of 
the continuity assumption. I show two estimates per variable. While Panel A uses a local quadratic 
regression, Panel B uses a local linear regression. Overall, the conditional distributions of these 
variables do not show discontinuous behaviour at the threshold. I find no statistically significant 
coefficients for previous academic performance and attendance, age, enrolment in public or rural 
schools, household income and size, or the schooling and gender of the head of the household. 
Gender is the only variable for which I obtain a 95% statistically significant estimate. The 
differences in the estimated proportion of males at the threshold are 0.027 and 0.022 points. For 
both Panel A and Panel B, the joint tests of statistical significance of these ten variables are not 
rejected. 
 
To sum up, the main causal estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. If an 
effect of the BLE in 2013 exists (for students near the 30% relative income threshold), its size is 
likely to be no larger than a small fraction of a standard deviation and cannot be statistically 
detected. There is a small discontinuity in the distribution of gender, but no other pre-treatment 
variable shows this behaviour. In my sample, being male is not correlated with attendance; thus it 
is improbable that this outcome is affected. Being male is weakly negatively correlated with future 
average grade. This correlation may explain the negative coefficients for average grade. If this is 
the case the causal estimates could be slightly downwardly biased. However, the effects are most 
likely small in magnitude and not statistically significant. 
 
RD Graphs and Running Variable Density Test 
 
Figure 1 presents the density of the PFSE scores among the subgroup of students in the highest 
30% of academic achievement and the results of the manipulation test proposed by Frandsen 
(2017). No abrupt changes in the density are observed along this figure or close to the BLE 
threshold (vertical line). The test fails to reject the hypothesis of no difference in the expected 
density at each side of the threshold. The most rigorous application, with no degree of curvature 
allowed, has a p-value of 0.187. The p-value increases when I partly relax this restriction. 
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Figure 1: PFSE Score Density and Frandsen Manipulation Test 
(Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
 
 
Manipulation test (k=0) p-value=0.187 
Manipulation test (k=0.1) p-value=0.221 
Manipulation test (k=0.2) p-value=0.293 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD 
 
Figure 2 presents a series of graphs that depict the relationship between the running variable and 
the outcomes of the assessment. Future average grade graphs can be found in the upper panel of 
the figure, while future attendance graphs are in the lower panel. In general terms, the figure shows 
a positive but weak association between the PFSE scores and both types of outcomes. More 
importantly, no graph shows a relevant discontinuity between the polynomial fitted functions at 
each side of the vertical line. Any detected discontinuity is small and not statistically significant as 
the confidence intervals of the fitted functions noticeably overlap at the threshold. This evidence is 
consistent with the RD estimates of Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 3 shows eight graphs that illustrate the relationship between the PFSE scores in 2012 and 
the variables that could not have been affected by the BLE in 2013. Some variables, such as 
income and head of household’s schooling, have an evident degree of association with the PFSE 
scores. Conversely, other variables have a weaker correlation with the PFSE index. From any of the 
eight graphs I present in Figure 3 it is possible to claim that discontinuous behaviour exists for a 
pre-treatment variable at the threshold. In all cases where a difference in the polynomial fit is 
observed, this is small in magnitude. Additionally, the 95% confidence intervals of the polynomial 
fits mostly overlap in each of these eight graphs. Although not strictly comparable with the 
estimates in Table 6, Figure 3 provides similar insights to this source. 
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Table 2: RD Estimates for Outcomes (Using Mean Squared Error Optimal Bandwidth) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Social Development 
 
Table 3: RD Estimates for Future Average Grade (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Social Development 
 
Table 5: RD Estimates for Future Attendance (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
and Ministry of Social Development 
Outcomes 
average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.025 -0.098 0.108 0.106 
Original Outcome (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.146) (0.107) (0.159) (0.143) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 0.012 0.011 
In Standard Deviations (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) 
         
Number of Observations 91,832 95,380 87,263 87,263 109,231 105,768 125,075 73,092 
Bandwidth Size (h) 25.73 27.50 24.96 24.87 31.14 30.45 35.58 21.12 
Order p of Local 
Polynomial 
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Outcomes 
average_grade2013 average_grade2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.010 -0.016 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 0.001 -0.011 
Original Outcome (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013) 
         
Number of Observations 136,909 45,760 144,061 49,285 128,471 41,880 128,471 41,880 
Bandwidth Size (h) 38.59 12.86 41.25 13.75 37.43 12.48 37.31 12.44 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Outcomes 
attendance2013 attendance2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.090 -0.166 -0.090 -0.028 0.122 0.034 0.080 0.005 
Original Outcome (0.122) (0.200) (0.093) (0.143) (0.134) (0.219) (0.121) (0.196) 
         
Number of Observations 166,185 56,237 162,448 52,798 185,597 62,667 111,405 38,417 
Bandwidth Size (h) 46.71 15.57 45.68 15.23 53.37 17.79 31.69 10.56 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
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Table 4: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables (Using Mean Squared Error Optimal Bandwidth) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Treatment 
Variables (Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
avg_grade2012 attendance2012 age male schoolpub schoolrural hmonthincome hsize hhschooling hhfemale 
           
Panel A: Order p of Local Polynomial =2 (Local Quadratic Regression) 
RD Estimate: -0.007 -0.086 0.014 0.027** -0.007 -0.004 -1,024.1 0.014 -0.102 0.001 
Original Var. (0.008) (0.130) (0.043) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (2,743.5) (0.029) (0.080) (0.010) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
120,566 96,218 117,115 100,039 106,700 103,351 100,039 106,652 79,028 110,005 
Bandwidth Size 
(h) 
34.09 26.94 32.68 28.77 29.84 28.66 28.50 31.37 22.87 32.40 
           
Panel B: Order p of Local Polynomial =1 (Local Linear Regression) 
RD Estimate: -0.006 -0.135 0.012 0.022** -0.004 -0.002 -1,070.2 0.011 -0.085 -0.000 
Original Var. (0.007) (0.099) (0.038) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (2,364.1) (0.025) (0.064) (0.008) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
85,347 92,635 85,347 65,158 74,553 81,678 61,849 72,109 61,849 79,028 
Bandwidth Size 
(h) 
24.20 25.86 23.84 18.58 20.98 22.84 17.81 20.55 17.95 22.77 
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Figure 2: Future Outcomes by PFSE Score in 2012 (Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Figure 3: Pre-Treatment Variables by PFSE Score in 2012 (Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
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Figure 3 (continued): Pre-Treatment Variables by PFSE Score in 2012 (Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
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Average Grade in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
RD Estimates 
 
Table 7 presents the results for future average grade and attendance. The first four columns focus 
on the former type of outcome, while the last four focus on the latter. The first type of RD estimate 
per outcome (𝛽2) uses a bandwidth h of 0.3 and a local quadratic regression. The second type of 
estimate comes from a local linear regression that uses a bandwidth h of 0.2. 
 
All the main estimates for future average grade are small and not statistically different from zero 
at a 95% level of confidence. The estimates fluctuate from a minimum of –0.003 points (–0.004𝜎) 
to a maximum of 0.017 points (0.027𝜎). This last value is close to achieving a 95% level of 
statistical significance given that its standard error is 0.015𝜎. The range for the estimates of 
attendance goes from –0.043% to 0.147% (–0.005 to 0.016 of a standard deviation). Given that the 
highest standard error is 0.020𝜎, the approach would have detected statistical significance for any 
estimate higher than 0.040𝜎. Overall, these results are similar to the estimates in Table 3. 
 
Table 8 and Table 9 summarise the sensitivity analysis by bandwidth choice. Overall, between the 
outputs of each of these tables and the estimates from Table 7, the differences in magnitude are 
positive but small. The estimates for future average grade in Table 8 are all close to zero (ranging 
from 0.002 to 0.023 points). Some estimates are statistically significant at a 95% level of 
confidence but overall these are not robust to alternative specifications. The estimates for 
attendance in 2013 and 2014 are small and lack any statistical significance. The estimates for 
2013 range from 0.012% to 0.053%, and in 2014 from 0.138% to 0.189%. 
 
Table 10 presents the estimates for ten pre-treatment variables. The specifications I use per 
variable follow a similar pattern to Table 7. The Panel A estimates are the result of a local 
quadratic regression run in a bandwidth of size 0.3. Panel B provides the results for a local linear 
regression run in a bandwidth of size 0.2. This approach helps to assess the likelihood of the 
continuity assumption to hold, as the BLE could have impacted none of these variables.   
 
Overall, no clear discontinuities emerge in the distribution of any of these variables at the 
threshold. I find no significant differences from zero at a 95% level of confidence. The only 
estimate at a 90% level of confidence is average grade in 2012 for a local linear regression (p=1). 
Given that this coefficient is small and positive, if the average grade linear causal estimates in 
Tables 7 and 8 are not free of bias, these estimates would be slightly inflated. Accordingly, the 
potential unbiased estimates would be lower and less likely to be statistically significant. 
 
The main causal estimates for both outcomes are not statistically significantly different from zero 
at a 95% level of confidence. I observe statistically significant coefficients for some alternative 
specifications of average grade, but these are not robust. The main estimates for both outcomes 
are near zero and have standard errors no larger than 0.020 of a standard deviation. Hence, for 
students around the 30% of highest achievement, the BLE in 2013 is unlikely to have caused a 
substantial effect.   
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RD Graphs and Running Variable Density Test 
 
Figure 4 presents the density of the normalised average grade variable among the poorest 30% of 
students. Overall, the distribution of the distance of average grade to the cohort threshold T is 
smooth. The density decreases when approaching the zero threshold (the vertical line) from the 
left and increases when reaching this cutoff point from the right. The Frandsen test is not able to 
detect significant deviations in the expected density of the running variable. The minimum p-value 
of the test, for the most rigorous version of it, is 0.678. 
 
Figure 4: Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold Density and Frandsen Manipulation Test 
(Students With PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
 
 
Manipulation test (k=0) p-value=0.678 
Manipulation test (k=0.1) p-value=0.862 
Manipulation test (k=0.2) p-value=0.989 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the running variable and the outcomes. The upper 
panel shows the graphs for average grade while the lower panel focuses on attendance. The figure 
displays a positive association between the running variable and the outcomes. This association is 
strong as the confidence intervals of the fits are narrow. If the polynomial fits at each side of the 
vertical line were to be extended to the threshold it would not be possible to distinguish a clear 
discontinuity. In other words, any estimated discontinuity in the extrapolation would most likely be 
small. However, it does not seem possible to discard statistically significant differences only by 
looking at this figure. Although it is not strictly comparable, this graphic evidence is concordant 
with the results in Tables 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Figure 6 shows eight graphs that illustrate the relationship between the running variable and other 
variables that could not have been affected by the BLE in 2013. The relationship between the 
running variable and each of these eight pre-treatment variables differs notoriously. The graphs 
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help to determine the plausibility of the continuity assumption to hold. No discontinuous 
relationships at the threshold are noticeable from the figure. No graph suggests an abrupt change 
in the projected distributions of the pre-treatment variables at the threshold. The results from 
Table 10 are consistent with Figure 6. Both findings provide support for the suitability of this RD 
approach to identify the causal effects of the Bono por Logro Escolar in 2013. 
 
Table 5: RD Estimates for Outcomes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Social Development 
 
 
Table 6: RD Estimates for Future Average Grade (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Social Development 
 
 
 
 
 
Outcomes 
average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.003 0.006 0.010 0.017* -0.043 0.009 0.119 0.147 
Original Outcome (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.169) (0.126) (0.188) (0.141) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.004 0.010 0.016 0.027* -0.005 0.001 0.013 0.016 
In Standard Deviations (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) 
         
Number of Observations 166,638 112,023 163,219 109,783 166,638 112,023 163,219 109,783 
Bandwidth Size (h)  0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Local 
Polynomial 
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Outcomes 
average_grade2013 average_grade2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: 0.004 0.002 0.016** 0.011 0.016* 0.014 0.023*** 0.021** 
Original Outcome (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
         
Number of Observations 269,585 219,355 219,355 166,638 263,547 214,693 214,693 163,219 
Bandwidth Size (h) 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
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Table 7: RD Estimates for Future Attendance (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Social Development 
Outcomes 
attendance2013 attendance2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: 0.020 0.012 0.053 0.043 0.189 0.183 0.138 0.160 
Original Outcome (0.124) (0.138) (0.101) (0.110) (0.139) (0.155) (0.113) (0.123) 
         
Number of Observations 269,585 219,355 219,355 166,638 263,547 214,693 214,693 163,219 
Bandwidth Size (h) 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
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Table 8: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Treatment 
Variables (Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
avg_grade2012 attendance2012 age male schoolpub schoolrural hmonthincome hsize hhschooling hhfemale 
           
Panel A: Bandwidth h=0.3 & Local Quadratic Regression (p=2) 
RD Estimate:  0.002 -0.152 0.070 0.017 0.012 0.004 827.5 0.022 -0.047 -0.007 
Original Var. (0.008) (0.146) (0.045) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (2,175.9) (0.031) (0.070) (0.010) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
169,944 169,944 169,943 164,310 169,944 169,944 164,310 164,310 164,310 164,310 
           
Panel B: Bandwidth h=0.2 & Local Linear Regression (p=1) 
RD Estimate: 0.012* -0.064 0.044 0.013 0.008 0.002 1,028.4 0.010 -0.000 -0.005 
Original Var. (0.007) (0.113) (0.037) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (1,525.1) (0.022) (0.052) (0.008) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
114,153 114,153 114,152 110,369 114,153 114,153 110,369 110,369 110,369 110,369 
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 Figure 5: Future Outcomes by Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold in 2012 (Students With PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
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Figure 6: Pre-Treatment Variables by Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold in 2012 (Students With PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
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Figure 6 (continued): Pre-Treatment Variables by Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold in 2012 (Students With PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
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Summary  
 
I analyse different effects of receiving the BLE in 2013 over two groups of students, those around 
the 30% threshold of lower income and around the 30% threshold of highest academic 
achievement. Despite using different approaches, the value of zero is part of the 95% confidence 
interval in every main causal estimate. Additionally, the standard errors range from 0.013𝜎 to 
0.021𝜎.  
 
Figure 7 summarises the main estimates for average grade. The left panel of the figure uses the 
outcome original scale. The right-hand panel shows the estimates in standard deviations. The 
most negative estimate of the 95% confidence interval lower bound is –0.034 (–0.053𝜎) while the 
highest estimate of the upper bound is 0.035 (0.056𝜎). These values represent nearly one third of 
the shortest distance between two grades in the country’s educational system.  
 
Figure 7: Summary of RD Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals for Average Grade 
 
y: year of outcome is 2013 or 2014;  
rv: running variable is PFSE score or distance of average grade;  
p: order of local polynomial is one or two. 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
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Figure 8 summarises the main estimates for attendance. The left and right-hand panels of the 
figure present the estimates using the outcome original scale and in standard deviations, 
respectively. The smallest estimate of the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is –0.37% (–
0.044𝜎), while the largest estimate of the upper bound is 0.49% (0.052𝜎). In practice, the latter 
value is equivalent to one day of attendance at school within an academic year.  
 
Figure 8: Summary of RD Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals for Attendance 
 
y: year of outcome is 2013 or 2014;  
rv: running variable is PFSE score or distance of average grade;  
p: order of local polynomial is one or two. 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Given these estimates, if frontier-specific average effects of the BLE in 2013 exist these are most 
likely to be modest in magnitude. Thus, I am unable to detect them with statistical certainty. These 
findings also hold after I apply the local randomisation RD framework (in Appendix C) and calculate 
the effect of the BLE in 2014 (in Appendix D). The RD design provides average estimates that may 
miss causal effects on some population subgroups. Additionally, the RD estimates are only valid for 
observations near the threshold, which are not the poorest of the population in this paper. Appendix 
E analyses the impact of the BLE in 2013 over some population subgroups. This analysis does not 
consistently show estimates that are statistically different from zero. Therefore, any effects of this 
kind are unlikely to be large and could not be captured with statistical certainty. 
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Conclusion  
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on cash for grades impact assessments. I 
estimate the effect of a Chilean cash for grades programme on subsequent attendance and 
academic performance. Specifically, I evaluate the impact of the Bono por Logro Escolar in 2013. 
As the cash transfer in 2013 was targeted using two scores from 2012, an income index and 
academic performance, it is possible to implement a sharp RD design along these two running 
variables. The differences in students’ outcomes at the two thresholds used have a causal 
interpretation.  
 
The main causal estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero for both types of 
outcomes. If anything, the BLE frontier-specific average effects are modest and as a result I am 
unable to detect them with statistical certainty. The size of these potential effects is smaller than 
those statistically significant effects of near 0.20𝜎 found for interventions of this kind in developing 
countries (Behrman et al., 2015; Kremer et al., 2009). The results by subgroups do not consistently 
show estimates that are statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
RD estimates are informative for the population around the thresholds but not necessarily away 
from them. By design my BLE impact estimates only provide information for students around the 
poorest 30% threshold and around the top 30% in terms of highest academic achievement. As RD 
estimates provide average effects for the population near the thresholds, the features of the 
design do not facilitate observing effects for entire subgroups. For example, we cannot learn about 
the effects of the BLE for those at the lower end of the income distribution who are at the median 
or the bottom end in terms of academic achievement. These subgroups of the population may be 
the ones who are more susceptible and would benefit the most from cash for grades programmes.  
 
Given these caveats it is not possible to generalise my results for the entire population who 
received the BLE in 2013. Future research could overcome these limitations by introducing some 
degree of randomisation, allowing for obtaining estimates for the entire population that are 
expected to be eligible for the cash for grades intervention or entire subgroups of interest.  
 
A possible explanation for the results is that the programme was not very salient for the targeted 
adolescents. The sample I analyse were not able to collect payments on their own. These were 
received by an adult member of their household. Moreover, students may not have learnt about the 
existence of the programme when it was first implemented in 2013. If children were unaware of the 
implementation of the BLE then it would not be expected to observe changes in their behaviour. If 
this is still the case, then programme managers could implement actions that increase students’ 
awareness of the benefits (for example, by also giving a diploma to students).  
 
An alternative reason is that children were aware of the cash transfer but unresponsive to its $100 
USD maximum size. The monthly minimum wage was $210,000 CLP (approximately $410 USD) in 
August 2013. If this is a likely scenario then raising the amount of the cash transfer could lead to 
increased effects. However, whether this is a cost-effective initiative compared to others available 
deserves more analysis. Another potential explanation for my results is that the BLE provided two 
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types of effects that cancelled each other out overall. The price effect may have incentivised effort 
(measured by attendance) while a psychological factor could have reduced it.  
 
All these different hypotheses deserve further exploration in future research. Unlike my paper (which 
addresses the question of whether the BLE worked), this research will need to focus on a different 
question: why is the BLE producing little effect on educational outcomes? Interviewing parents and 
students to find out how aware they are of the BLE implementation could prove useful. Additionally, 
these interviews could help to understand the causal mechanisms (or lack of them) between 
providing this cash transfer and subsequent improvements in effort and academic performance. 
Given the nature of this inquiry, this research should probably be qualitative. 
 
Unlike the other programmes analysed in the literature, the BLE treatment assignment was not 
randomised at a higher level than students. Other schemes had a group of courses or schools that 
were part of a treatment group while the rest belonged to a control group. Conversely, in Chile 
within the same course it is possible to observe BLE eligible and ineligible students. Hence, in this 
context students may compete for access to the BLE. Students that did not receive the programme 
in 2013 may have observed classmates or other students accessing the cash transfer. This could 
have influenced awareness about the BLE and future academic performance in terms of accessing 
the cash transfer in the future (for example in 2014 and 2015). If this hypothesis is correct, then we 
would expect to observe higher estimates using the PFSE index as a running variable than for 
average grade (as eligibility by PFSE score is harder to modify by the student relative to academic 
performance). However, this is not the case and this hypothesis is unlikely to hold. 
 
This paper provides multiple other contributions to the cash for grades evaluation literature. 
Beyond analysing the effect of a cash for grades intervention in a context of competition, I study 
the impact on an overall measure of academic performance, the average grade. This contrasts 
with the subject-specific criteria (for example test scores in maths, reading or writing) commonly 
found in the previous literature. Then, an additional potential explanation for the lack of results for 
the BLE is that for students it implies too much effort, or it is too hard to improve in all subjects (or 
to improve largely in a few subjects) to increase their average grade. 
 
Whether to reward children according to their academic performance remains a hotly debated and 
unresolved topic. I observe no significant effects on educational outcomes for the first Chilean 
cash for grades programme. Further research and an enhanced BLE design may be needed to 
deliver grades for cash. Otherwise, the country risks little return on its money. 
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Appendix A. Summary of Cash for Grades Evaluations in Schools  
 
Table 9: Summary of Cash for Grades Evaluations (Randomised Control Trials) in Primary and Secondary Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                     
12 The currency of all the cash transfers described in Table 11 is United States Dollars.  
Author(s) Country/State Programme Description12 Main Results 
Kremer, Miguel and 
Thornton (2009) 
Kenya 
Girls who performed well in academic exams had their school 
fees paid for two years (7th and 8th grade) and received a grant 
of $19.20 per year. The scholarship schools were randomly 
selected from two Kenyan districts. The scholarship was 
awarded to the highest scoring 15% of 6th grade girls in the 
programme schools within each district. 
An overall effect of 0.19𝜎 is found on 
academic exams. The results are 
statistically significant in one out of two 
districts. Positive externalities are 
observed among girls with low pre-test 
scores and for some boys. 
Angrist and Lavy 
(2009) 
Israel 
Treatment assigned at the school level (among very low 
performing schools). The programme lasted for three years. 
The awards were given to high school students. A student who 
passed all achievement milestones (mainly exams related to 
obtaining a high school matriculation certificate) could obtain 
just under $2,400. 
Positive results in certification rates for 
girls (on the order of 0.10 percentage 
points). The results are mainly driven 
by the group for whom the certification 
is "within reach". No effects on boys.  
Fryer (2011) 
Chicago and 
New York 
The experiment had two cash for grades arms. In Chicago, 9th 
graders were paid every five weeks upon performance in five 
core courses. The maximum a student could have won in a year 
was $2,000. In New York City, 4th and 7th grade students were 
rewarded based on internal assessments. The maximum 
amount students could have made in a school-year was $250 
and $500, respectively. School-based randomised control trials 
determined treatment. 
In both states, no effects are found in 
maths or reading achievement tests. In 
Chicago, marginally significant effects 
(0.10 of a standard deviation) are 
observed for grades in the five core 
subjects. In New York, the effects on 
the interim assessments are, if 
anything, negative.   
Bettinger (2012) Ohio 
Cash payments (as much as $100 per student) were given to 
students in the 3rd through to the 6th grade for scoring 
"proficient" or "advanced" in their (state level) standardised 
testing. Eligibility by randomisation at the school-grade level.  
Positive effects (0.15 of a standard 
deviation) for maths but no impacts are 
observed in reading, social science and 
science test scores. 
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Table 11 (continued): Summary of Cash for Grades Evaluations (Randomised Control Trials) in Primary and Secondary Education 
  
Author(s) Country/State Programme Description Main Results 
Levitt et al. (2012) Chicago 
Low-income children and adolescents were offered cash ($10 
or $20) for an improvement in a computer test score. These 
tests lasted between 15 to 60 minutes. Randomisation 
occurred at the class or school-grade level. 
An effect of approximately a tenth of a 
standard deviation is observed for the 
$20 incentive. No effects for the $10 
transfer. Secondary students are more 
responsive to the size of the transfer 
relative to elementary students.  
Riccio et al. (2013) New York 
Payments, available for three years, were awarded when low-
income households met specific education-based conditions 
of children. Among these conditions were superior 
attendance at school and certain performance levels in 
standardised tests. Each child was rewarded with between 
$600 and $700 per year for scoring proficient or above. The 
selection of families or households into the programme was 
made randomly. 
The intervention does not improve 
outcomes for elementary and middle 
school students but shows effects 
among high school students who are 
more academically prepared than their 
peers (who entered high school as 
proficient readers). 
Behrman et al. (2015) Mexico 
Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students were 
assigned to three treatment groups and a control group at 
random. In one of the treatment groups the payments 
depended on student performance in mathematics tests in 
10th to 12th grade. Payments ranged from $227 up to $1,363 
(depending on the level of progress in the tests). 
Effects ranging between 0.17 and 0.30 
of a standard deviation on maths test 
scores. All the estimates are statistically 
significant, but these results are partly 
explained by students copying. 
Hirshleifer (2017) India 
The intervention was carried out among school children (4th 
through 6th grade) as an experiment (randomisation at the 
classroom-level). Two tests were implemented. The cash 
transfer, up to $3, depended on the result of the first test. A 
second test was only used to measure students’ learning. 
A positive result (0.24 of a standard 
deviation relative to the control group) is 
found but this is not statistically 
significant due to low statistical power. 
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Appendix B. Using Relative Ranking in a Regression Discontinuity Design  
 
If I use a local randomisation RD framework, then I should expect not to observe statistically 
significant differences in the pre-treatment variables across the 0.3 threshold in relative ranking. 
This logic follows what is commonly shown in experimental designs. I choose two tiny windows of 
relative ranking (w=0.002 and w=0.005) to implement this RD framework. Therefore, this approach 
only uses observations whose relative ranking lies within the interval [0.3–w, 0.3+w]. I obtain the 
RD estimates in this framework from the following regression: 
 
𝑋𝑖 =  𝛼3  +  𝛽3 𝐼3𝑖 + 𝜀3𝑖, 
 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a pre-treatment variable for student i in year t–1, 𝐼3𝑖 is a binary variable that takes a 
value of one if the relative ranking for student i in year t–1 is equal to or lower than 0.3. Otherwise, 
this variable takes a value of zero. 𝜀3𝑖 represents the error term of the regression. 
 
Table 12 shows 𝛽3. Each estimate is equivalent to the difference in means across the threshold. 
Panel A shows that students with a relative ranking in the [0.298,0.3] interval notably differ 
compared to those in the ]0.3,0.302] interval. The first group, relative to the second, had higher 
average grades and attendance levels in 2012. These differences are statistically significant at a 
99% level of confidence. Additionally, students in the first group were younger, and most likely to 
be enrolled in primary education, in a rural school and to belong to smaller cohorts relative to their 
peers. Panel B shows that the differences become smaller as the window w increases, but many 
estimates remain statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
 
In a continuity-based framework, a discontinuous relationship between the relative ranking and 
each pre-treatment variable will cast doubt on the plausibility of the continuity assumption. The 
estimates for the pre-treatment variables in this framework are provided by the regression: 
 
𝑋𝑖 =  𝛼4  +  𝛽4 𝐼4𝑖 +  𝜃4𝑓(∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖) + 𝛾4𝑓(∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖)𝐼4𝑖 + 𝜀4𝑖, 
 
where ∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖is 0.3-relative ranking in t–1 for student i, 𝐼4𝑖 is a binary variable that takes a 
value of one if ∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 is non-negative. Otherwise, the variable takes a value of zero. 
Additionally, 𝑓(𝑥) is a local polynomial function of x of order p and 𝜀4𝑖 models the error term. 
Table 13 shows 𝛽4. I present two estimates per variable, both using an ad-hoc data-driven 
bandwidth and small order polynomials. Multiple statistically significant estimates are observed, 
for example average grade and attendance in 2012, cohort size and rural school.  
 
The evidence I present in Tables 12 and 13 suggests that the variation in BLE treatment cannot be 
considered as good as random near the 0.3 relative ranking threshold. There are systematic 
differences between students in the neighbourhood of this cutoff. These differences are very likely 
to affect potential outcomes and will bias the RD estimates in both frameworks.  
 
The relative ranking is the result of a two-step transformation. In the first step the average grade is 
transformed into a ranking. In the second step the ranking is divided by the cohort size. This 
37           Social Policy Working Paper 04-19    
procedure defines some characteristics for observations around a relative ranking value of 0.3. 
Table 14 summarises possible values for academic cohort size in relative ranking intervals. 
 
Observations with a relative ranking of 0.3 can only come from a cohort whose size is a multiple of 
ten. Observations in the [0.298, 0.3[ or the ]0.3, 0.302] intervals necessarily come from cohorts of 
at least 57 and 53 students. Expanding the observations to the [0.295, 0.3[ and ]0.3, 0.305] intervals 
reduces the minimum cohort sizes to 27 and 23. Therefore, students whose relative ranking is 0.3 
come from cohorts with distinctive characteristics relative to those who are very close to this 
threshold. Table 15 provides summary statistics to prove this point. 
 
Students whose relative ranking is 0.3 belong to cohorts whose average size is 43.63. The average 
cohort size near this threshold increases sharply. Moreover, other characteristics of the schools 
and students are substantially different. Students with a relative ranking of 0.3 are more likely to be 
enrolled in a primary school, to be younger and to attend a rural school. Additionally, these 
students had a higher academic performance and attendance in 2012. 
 
Tables 14 and 15 provide evidence against comparability between students whose relative ranking  
is 0.3 and their peers just above and below this threshold. In an RD design for the BLE, students  
with a relative ranking of 0.3 will be pooled together with those who are slightly below this value.  
This will attenuate the problems but will not solve them. Overall, there are no comparable  
observations for students whose relative ranking is 0.3. An additional challenge is that students at  
each side of the threshold are almost certain to come from different cohorts. Given all this  
evidence, the relative ranking is not a suitable running variable for an RD design.
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Table 10: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Local Randomisation Framework 
 
Pre-Treatment Variables 
(Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
av_grade2012 attendance2012 age schoolprimary schoolrural cohort_size hmonthincome hhschooling hhfemale 
          
Panel A: Size of Window w=0.002 
RD Estimate: 0.094*** 1.040*** -0.396*** 0.142*** 0.206*** -48.89*** -10,488.7* -0.380** -0.021 
Original Var. (0.023) (0.359) (0.134) (0.039) (0.016) (4.07) (5,494.6) (0.160) (0.025) 
          
Number of Observations 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,271 2,271 2,271 
          
Panel B: Size of Window w=0.005 
RD Estimate 0.046*** 0.434** -0.084 0.033 0.098*** -13.03*** -4,222.5 -0.119 -0.012 
Original Var. (0.014) (0.213) (0.076) (0.020) (0.012) (2.40) (3,374.4) (0.100) (0.015) 
          
Number of Observations 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 4,917 4,917 4,917 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Table 11: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Continuity-Based Framework (Using Mean Squared Error Optimal Bandwidth) 
 
Pre-Treatment 
Variables 
(Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
av_grade2012 attendance2012 age schoolprimary schoolrural cohort_size hmonthincome hhschooling hhfemale 
          
Panel A: Order p of Local Polynomial =2 (Local Quadratic Regression) 
RD Estimate: 0.025*** 0.282** -0.085* 0.031** 0.084*** -16.79*** -1,374.0 -0.126** -0.025*** 
Original Var. (0.010) (0.134) (0.051) (0.015) (0.011) (2.18) (1,987.0) (0.064) (0.010) 
          
Number of 
Observations 
97,336 143,886 109,592 97,240 78,797 61,704 126,062 127,140 117,446 
Bandwidth 
Size 
0.094 0.139 0.106 0.093 0.075 0.060 0.126 0.127 0.117 
          
Panel B: Order p of Local Polynomial =1 (Local Linear Regression) 
RD Estimate: 0.020** 0.232* -0.037 0.016 0.081*** -14.29*** -739.5 -0.111* -0.020*** 
Original Var. (0.008) (0.120) (0.036) (0.011) (0.010) (1.82) (1,449.6) (0.057) (0.007) 
          
Number of 
Observations 
70,027 87,241 101,376 87,304 48,226 42,843 110,176 76,554 102,748 
Bandwidth 
Size 
0.068 0.084 0.099 0.084 0.047 0.041 0.110 0.076 0.100 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Table 12: Theoretical Academic Cohort Size by Intervals of Relative Ranking 
 
Interval of Relative 
Ranking  
Minimum Academic  
Cohort Sizes 
Comments 
0.3 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 
Only academic cohorts whose size is a multiple of 10 can have observations whose 
relative ranking equals 0.3. 
[0.298, 0.3[ 57, 67, 77, 87, 97 First academic cohort size where it is theoretically possible to have observations in each 
of these two intervals of relative ranking is 255. ]0.3, 0.302] 53, 63, 73, 83, 93 
[0.295, 0.3[ 27, 37, 44, 47, 54, 57 First academic cohort size where it is theoretically possible to have observations in each 
of these two intervals of relative ranking is 105. ]0.3, 0.305] 23, 33, 43, 46, 53, 56 
 
 
Table 13: Summary Statistics (Mean Values) by Intervals of Relative Ranking 
 
Variables (Year 2012) 
Interval of Relative Ranking 
0.3 [0.298, 0.3[ ]0.3, 0.302] [0.295, 0.3[ ]0.3, 0.305] 
Cohort Size 43.63 123.35 115.79 96.01 88.12 
Average Grade 5.75 5.64 5.63 5.68 5.66 
Attendance (%) 93.81 92.48 92.38 92.76 92.74 
Primary School 0.808 0.566 0.595 0.655 0.683 
Age (Years) 12.16 12.84 12.76 12.58 12.50 
Rural School 0.278 0.060 0.008 0.081 0.062 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD
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Appendix C. Local Randomisation Regression Discontinuity Framework   
 
Using PFSE Scores as a Running Variable 
 
To implement a local randomisation RD framework, first I need to choose the size w of the window. 
The size of this window determines which observations of the running variable I use in the 
estimation. Hence, this RD design relies only on observations within the interval ]98–w, 98+w] of 
PFSE scores. I choose two values of w (w=1 and w=2). The justification behind this selection is 
twofold. Firstly, these values are the two minimum w available (no decimal places are available for 
the PFSE scores in my dataset). Secondly, these values are still likely to be small enough for the 
assumption on which the local experiment RD framework relies to hold. I obtain the RD impact 
estimates (𝛽5) in this framework from the following regression:
13 
 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼5  +  𝛽5 𝐼5𝑖 + 𝜀5𝑖 , 
 
where 𝑌𝑖  is the average grade or attendance for student i in year t or t+1. 𝐼5𝑖 is a binary variable that 
takes a value of one if the PFSE score for student i in year t–1 is equal to or lower than 98. 
Otherwise, this variable takes a value of zero. The error term corresponds to 𝜀5𝑖. 
 
The first four columns of Table 16 show the results for average grade in 2013 and 2014 while the 
last four columns show the estimates for future attendance. The estimates for future average 
grade are all negative and statistically insignificant. The estimates range from –0.023 (–0.037σ) to 
–0.003 points (–0.005σ). The estimates for attendance in 2013 and 2014 are all close to zero and 
not statistically significant at any level of confidence. The estimates range from –0.244% (–
0.026σ) to 0.071% (0.008σ). Overall, all these findings are similar to the ones observed in Table 3. 
For both types of outcomes, the estimates are closer to zero when w=2. In standard deviations, any 
estimate higher than 0.06σ will be statistically significant.  
 
Table 17 presents the local randomisation estimates for ten pre-treatment variables. To assess the 
internal validity of the estimates, I use the same regression but replace 𝑌𝑖 for each pre-treatment 
variable within 𝑋𝑖
′. These variables could not have been affected by the BLE in 2013.  
This step assesses the quality of the randomisation and, by extension, the internal validity of the 
causal estimates. The first two columns show the average grade and attendance in 2012. The third 
to the tenth columns present characteristics of the students, and their schools and households. 
Overall, the students at each side of the threshold tend not to differ in terms of these ten variables. 
For both Panels, the joint test of statistical significance of these ten variables is not rejected. 
 
Why can a Local Randomisation RD Framework not be used for Average Grade? 
 
In its original format the average grade is a continuous variable. A local experiment RD framework 
could be implemented using this variable in a neighbourhood around the threshold. However, 
previous academic performance is highly correlated with future average grades and attendance. 
                                                     
13 This coefficient equals the difference in means in the threshold's neighbourhood. 𝛽5 = ?̅?]98−w,98]. − ?̅?]98,98+w]. 
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Consequently, the critical assumption of an RD local experiment framework is only likely to hold in 
a very small window around the threshold. Students who differ only by a very tiny fraction in their 
average grade in 2012 are more likely to be comparable. Unfortunately, the average grade in Chile 
is rounded at the schools and only one decimal place is reported to the central level. The smallest 
interval of units available is the [T–0.1, T+0.1[ neighbourhood. 
 
Table 18 presents the local randomisation RD estimates. These are equivalent to differences in 
means between units in the [T, T+0.1[ and [T–0.1, T[ intervals of average grade in 2012. Among the 
poorest 30%, all students in the first group received the BLE in 2013 while the second group did 
not. Every estimate is statistically significant at a 99% level. These coefficients range from 0.102 to 
0.106 points for average grade, and between 0.399% and 0.476% for attendance. These results 
cannot be interpreted as evidence of treatment effects from the BLE. The variation in treatment is 
not as good as random within the [T–0.1, T+0.1[ neighbourhood. Table 19 shows that students at 
each side of the threshold within this neighbourhood significantly differ regarding key pre-
treatment variables such as their percentage of attendance in 2012 and the years of schooling of 
the head of their household. By construction, the students differ in their average grade in 2012. 
 
Potential outcomes are likely to be correlated with the running variable in the [T–0.1, T+0.1[ 
neighbourhood. Given the characteristics of my dataset, it not advisable to implement a local 
randomisation framework using average grades as a running variable. The estimates from this 
framework will not be useful, as they will encompass both treatment effects and selection bias. 
 
 
Table 14: RD Estimates for Outcomes in Local Randomisation Framework 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
Outcomes 
average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.023 -0.012 -0.012 -0.003 -0.222 -0.146 -0.244 0.071 
Original Outcome (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.233) (0.170) (0.279) (0.195) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.037 -0.020 -0.020 -0.005 -0.026 -0.017 -0.026 0.008 
In Standard Deviations (0.028) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) 
         
Number of Observations 3,539 6,901 3,515 6,840 3,539 6,901 3,515 6,840 
Size of Window w  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
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Table 15: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Local Randomisation Framework 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
Pre-Treatment 
Variables (Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
avg_grade2012 attendance2012 age male schoolpub schoolrural hmonthincome hsize  hhschooling hhfemale 
           
Panel A: Size of Window w=1 
RD Estimate: -0.019 -0.244 0.098* 0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -1,532.4 -0.014 -0.095 -0.004 
Original Var. (0.013) (0.192) (0.058) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (4,759.5) (0.048) (0.113) (0.017) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
3,567 3,567 3,567 3,430 3,567 3,567 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430 
           
Panel B: Size of Window w=2 
RD Estimate: -0.009 -0.033 0.064 0.024** -0.003 -0.002 -1,915.9 0.002 -0.078 0.002 
Original Var. (0.009) (0.139) (0.043) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (3,227.2) (0.034) (0.082) (0.012) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
6,959 6,959 6,959 6,722 6,959 6,959 6,722 6,722 6,722 6,722 
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Table 16: RD Estimates for Outcomes in Local Randomisation Framework (w=0.1) 
 
Outcomes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 
     
RD Estimates: Original 
Outcome 
0.106*** 
(0.004) 
0.102*** 
(0.004) 
0.399*** 
(0.067) 
0.476*** 
(0.076) 
Number of Observations 56,775 55,659 56,775 55,659 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Table 17: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Local Randomisation Framework (w=0.1) 
 
Pre-Treatment Variables (Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
average_grade2012 attendance2012 hmonthincome hhschooling 
     
RD Estimates: Original Var. 0.126*** 0.291*** 1,716.8* 0.085*** 
 (0.003) (0.055) (899.4) (0.027) 
Number of Observations 57,806 57,806 55,969 55,969 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
 
Appendix D. Effects of Receiving the BLE in 2014 on Educational Outcomes of 2015 
 
The body of the paper shows no statistically significant results for the BLE in 2013. A potential 
explanation for these results is that students were not aware enough about the implementation of 
the BLE in 2013. This was less likely to be the case after one year. Students who received the BLE 
in 2014 could have increased their effort and performance in 2015. This appendix explores the 
effects of receiving the BLE in 2014. In 2014 the BLE was implemented during September, three 
months before the end of the academic year. Given this late implementation, I only consider 
outcomes in 2015 in this assessment. 
 
In practice, the estimates for the BLE in 2014 remain not statistically different than zero. For 
average grade, Panel A in Table 20 shows that the estimates range from –0.016 to 0.004 points. 
The standard errors of these estimates range from 0.010 to 0.020 points. Panel B in Table 20 
presents the results for attendance. The estimates range from –0.042% to 0.041% while the 
standard errors are between 0.132% and 0.279%. The findings for the BLE in 2014 are like those in 
2013. I find no statistically significant effects. Consequently, if an effect exists for the BLE, it is 
likely to be small in magnitude and cannot be detected statistically. 
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Table 18: RD Estimates for Outcomes in 2015 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
 
Appendix E. Effects of Receiving the BLE in 2013 for Population Subgroups 
 
I analyse the effect of receiving the BLE in 2013 on educational outcomes in 2014 for multiple 
subgroups. I divide the first two groups by income. The hypothesis to test in this case is that the 
BLE is most likely to have an impact at the lower end of the income distribution. There is limited 
information on this question for cash for grades programmes, though Galiani and McEwan (2013) 
and Maluccio and Flores (2005) find in Honduras and Nicaragua, respectively, that conditional 
cash transfers have a stronger impact on school enrolment among children living in the poorest 
households.  
 
Analysis by Income (PFSE Scores) 
 
Table 21 shows RD estimates for average grade and attendance in 2014 using average grade in 
2012 as a running variable. The first row of Table 21 presents the results without using income 
subgroups. These results are equivalent to those shown in Table 7. Among those with a PFSE 
score equal to or lower than 98 points, I divide the sample into two. The first half is meant to 
include the poorest (approximately the bottom 15% in terms of income) while the other represents 
the second most deprived group (approximately between the bottom 15% to 30% in the income 
distribution).  
 
 
 
RD Framework and  
Running Variable (RV) 
Local Randomisation 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: Average Grade 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Panel A: Estimates for Average Grade in 2015 
RD Estimates: -0.010 -0.007 -0.016 -0.013 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
Number of Observations 3,094 6,023 103,352 67,235 133,102 89,748 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 33.84 21.77 0.300 0.200 
       
Panel B: Estimates for Attendance in 2015 
RD Estimates -0.009 -0.025 0.039 0.041 -0.042 0.021 
 (0.279) (0.197) (0.185) (0.132) (0.205) (0.152) 
Number of Observations 3,094 6,023 82,467 82,467 133,102 89,748 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 27.40 27.14 0.300 0.200 
       
Order p of Polynomial NA NA 2 1 2 1 
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Table 19: RD Estimates for Outcomes in 2014 by Halves of Lowest PFSE Scores in Continuity-
Based Framework (Using Average Grade in 2012 as a Running Variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD 
 
Table 21 shows that the first group has more positive estimates than the second group. The 
impact estimates for average grade in 2014 are 0.020 and 0.023 for the poorest. Only one estimate 
is statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence. Therefore, the significance is not robust to 
alternative specifications. The impact estimates for attendance in 2014 are 0.234% and 0.277% for 
the poorest, neither of which is statistically significant. Conversely, the RD estimates for the 
second poorest half are close to zero for both types of outcomes. 
 
There is not enough evidence to claim that the BLE in 2013 had a statistically significant effect in 
2014 on the poorest of the population. Given the standard errors shown, 0.012 and 0.016 for 
average grade and 0.185% and 0.257% for attendance, if an effect of the BLE exists on the poorest 
then it is at most modest in size and could not be captured consistently with statistical certainty. 
 
Analysis by Gender and Educational Level 
 
The next two groups are boys and girls. The final two groups of students are those who were either 
in the fifth or sixth grade and between seventh and tenth grade in 2012, respectively. In 2014 the 
former group was most likely to be enrolled in primary education while the latter group was most 
likely to be enrolled in secondary education. These two pairs of groups are justified in terms of the 
cash for grades literature, where heterogeneous results have been observed.     
 
Table 22 and Table 23 present RD estimates for average grade and attendance in 2014, 
respectively. The first four columns in each table provide estimates that use PFSE scores as a 
running variable. The first and second columns focus on the local randomisation framework, while 
the third and fourth rely on the continuity-based framework. The last two columns of each table 
provide estimates for the continuity-based framework using the distance of average grade in 2012 
as a running variable. The first row of each table provides the estimates without using subgroups. 
Subgroup 
Outcomes 
Average Grade in 2014 Attendance in 2014 
     
Total 0.010 0.017* 0.119 0.147 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.188) (0.141) 
1st Poorest Half 0.020 0.023** 0.234 0.277 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.257) (0.185) 
2nd Poorest Half -0.000 0.010 -0.008 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.256) (0.185) 
Bandwidth h 0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Polynomial 2 1 2 1 
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These estimates are equal to those presented in Tables 3, 7 and 16. 
 
From Table 22 it can be seen that girls have less negative estimates than boys in all the 
specifications and frameworks I use and that students between the seventh and tenth grades have 
mostly lower estimates relative to younger students. Only the local linear regressions using 
average grade as a running variable provide some statistically significant estimates. The estimates 
by subgroup mostly remain close to zero and are statistically insignificant. Overall, these estimates 
are not very different from those of the entire sample. 
 
There is less consistent behaviour by subgroup for attendance in 2014. Table 23 shows that the RD 
estimates for boys are lower when I use the PFSE as a running variable but higher when the 
estimations rely upon previous academic performance. I observe a similar case for students in the 
fifth and sixth grades in 2012 relative to their peers in higher grades. Two estimates for the former 
subgroup show some degree of statistical significance in one type of RD framework.  
 
Overall, the estimates by gender and educational level remain close to zero and are statistically 
insignificant for both outcomes. Naturally, the analysis by subgroup has wider confidence intervals 
given the smaller samples. The standard errors for average grade vary from a maximum of 0.029 
points to a minimum of 0.012 points. Thus, the analysis by the subgroups of gender and 
educational level could have identified any estimate higher than 0.057 and as low as 0.024 points 
in average grade as statistically significant. Concerning attendance, the standard errors of the 
estimates range from 0.181% to 0.406%. Differences at the threshold higher than 0.800% and as 
low as 0.355% could have been statistically significant then. 
 
For both types of outcomes, in the few cases where I observe statistically significant estimates, 
the significance is sensitive to the RD framework I use. Additionally, within each RD framework, the 
significance is also sensitive to the specification I utilise. Given my results and analysis, if an effect 
of the BLE exists by gender and educational level it is highly unlikely to be large. Any potential 
effect of this kind could not be captured with statistical certainty in this assessment.   
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Table 20: RD Estimates for Average Grade in 2014 (by Subgroups) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
 
Table 21: RD Estimates for Attendance in 2014 (by Subgroups) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
 
Subgroups 
RD Framework and Running Variable 
Local Randomisation 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: Average Grade 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Total -0.012 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 0.010 0.017* 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
Boys -0.030 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 0.010 0.017 
 (0.029) (0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) 
Girls -0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.018 0.024** 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) 
5th to 6th Grade in 2012 0.008 -0.002 -0.000 0.007 0.023 0.028** 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
7th to 10th Grade in 2012 -0.017 -0.001 -0.011 -0.009 0.008 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 24.96 24.87 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Polynomial NA NA 2 1 2 1 
Subgroups 
RD Framework and Running Variable 
Local Randomisation 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: Average Grade 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Total -0.244 0.071 0.108 0.106 0.119 0.147 
 (0.279) (0.195) (0.159) (0.143) (0.188) (0.141) 
Boys -0.359 -0.049 -0.053 -0.060 0.268 0.142 
 (0.391) (0.279) (0.236) (0.214) (0.270) (0.205) 
Girls -0.164 0.101 0.178 0.177 -0.044 0.114 
 (0.406) (0.272) (0.210) (0.187) (0.257) (0.184) 
5th to 6th Grade in 2012 -0.197 0.022 -0.012 -0.008 0.438* 0.388** 
 (0.382) (0.284) (0.215) (0.192) (0.254) (0.181) 
7th to 10th Grade in 2012 -0.201 0.130 0.164 0.160 0.021 0.067 
 (0.362) (0.249) (0.208) (0.187) (0.246) (0.185) 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 35.58 21.12 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Polynomial NA NA 2 1 2 1 
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